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Transnationalizing Comparative Law 
 
Some twenty years ago, one of the top law schools in the United States decided to 
end all its courses in comparative and foreign law. This was done in the expectation 
that the then-fashionable end of history would also mean the end of diversity of 
legal systems and the global triumph of US law. Students of the future would merely 
need to learn ‘law’ (which meant US law) and be able to practice anywhere in the 
world. Needless to say, the prediction turned out to be premature. The school is 
now, like every other US law school, advertising its special competence in 
comparative law for its curriculum and for lawyers today. 
We should remember that reports on the death of comparative law, as suggested by 
the editors of this journal, are always, to paraphrase Mark Twain, greatly 
exaggerated. 1 Comparative law does not die so easily. Nor, however, does it remain 
unchanged. Rather, and unsurprisingly, comparative law is constantly evolving, in 
imperfect parallel with the development of law, and society, at large. Lawrence 
Rosen once suggested “we may have to renounce comparative law as we have at 
times known it in order to save it.”2 But the truth is that comparative law will always 
exist whether we (who is that anyway?) renounce it or not. If comparative lawyers 
of old refuse to go along with changes, it merely means that others will do it for 
them—grandiose economist for whom laws are mere data points for statistical 
analysis; ambitious young US scholars of constitutional law with often scant 
exposure to foreign societies and modes of thought but a keen interest in promoting 
their causes; brilliant lovers of French poststructuralist thought and its propensity 
for theory and meta-theory without the need to engage with actual foreign law. It is 
easy to ridicule these new developments from the standpoint of traditional 
comparative law. But what would be more helpful is to understand them as signs of 
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a change in the discipline. And in order to understand change we need to 
understand how comparative law was before we can have a sense of how it will be. 
1) Comparative Law in the Age of the Nation State 
What are reasons for this change? The most obvious reason is our ongoing paradigm 
shift from what we called a Westphalian model of the world to a globalized 
understanding of the world.3 In the Westphalian model, all law was either national 
(state) law or international law. The model created three important factors for 
comparative law,4 which we can date, very imprecisely, around 1600, 1800, and 
1900, and which we can name, not much more precisely, as: state, positivism, 
science. 
a) The State 
The first of these factors is the rise of the sovereign state—the idea that the state is 
all-encompassing (Hobbes) and sovereign (Bodin).  This implies the idea that the 
state has the exclusive power to make law. As a consequence, the focus in 
comparative law has come to be exclusively on states and their laws. Non-state laws 
like religious laws or customary law have all but disappeared from such studies 
(except when they were, as is the case with Islamic law in predominantly Muslim 
countries, turned into state law); responsibility for them has been deferred to other 
disciplines like religious studies or anthropology. Standard treatises on comparative 
law may contain non-state laws such as religious laws or customary laws in the 
discussion of legal families, but in microcomparison, these laws are all but 
forgotten.5 The new lex mercatoria, regardless of whether it is an autonomous law 
or (more plausibly) an amalgam of state and non-state law, is almost never looked at 
for comparative purposes. Merely non-state codifications like the UNIDROIT 
Principles of Comparative Law are considered. By and large, non-state law plays 
practically no role in comparative law; the field remains largely blind to the growth 
of global legal pluralism. 
b) Positive Law 
The second of these factors, namely the focus of comparative law on positive law, 
did not happen at the exact same time, at least outside of public law.6 Private law in 
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17th and 18th century Europe was still largely thought of as transnational; 
comparisons were made, if at all, between Roman and Germanic law, but not 
between the laws of different states. This idea that law is positive law resulted from 
the expansion of the state’s law-making power to private law, a fruit of the 
enlightenment that ripened fully with the French code civil of 1804. Legal positivism 
does not mean merely legislation, in the tradition of législation comparée (although 
comparative law has always given, and continues to give, disproportionate 
prominence to those.). But it does mean a near exclusive focus on law as official 
pronouncements in the name of the state. In an important way, the much-trumpeted 
difference between “law in the books” and “law in action” that we find so important 
in comparative law amounts to little more than the difference between scholarship 
and legislation on the one hand and court decisions on the other. Law in society 
rarely plays a role in traditional comparative law. It is sometimes said that the trend 
to positive law meant the end of comparative law, because it made lawyers narrow 
their focus from transnational to national law. This is only half-true. At the same 
time, the idea that law, including private law, was something national, created the 
possibility of difference between different laws, and as such made comparison 
possible.  
c) Legal Science 
The third factor, the idea that comparative law can be done scientifically, emerged in 
comparative law around the end of the 19th century, and in this limited sense the 
frequent claim that comparative law was born at the Paris Congress of 1900 has 
some justification.7. Of course, the rise of science and scientific method has a longer 
prehistory, in Western thought generally and also in comparative law. But it was 
arguably around 1900 that such an approach became generally accepted in the 
discipline. This scientific approach thus used was, for many, an approach of 
autonomous legal science, in this sense characterized by the German idea of 
Rechtswissenschaft. Although some comparative lawyers at the time, especially in 
France, flirted with the use of sociology, to a large extent the method of comparative 
law was not so different from the method of law more generally. This is not to say 
that comparative law had no critical aim, quite the contrary. Comparatists directed 
their critique against national parochialism and backwardness. In this sense, 
comparative law was a very modernist project. 
2) Comparative Law in the Age of Transnationalism 
 
These three aspects—a focus on state law, a focus on positive law, an emphasis on a 
legal-scientific approach to comparative law—continue to dominate much 
comparative law today. It is obvious that all three of them clash with the emergence 
of globalization as the new paradigm to replace the Westphalian model. 
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a) Beyond the State 
The state has lost its exclusive role in the global sphere. It has not become 
unimportant—some states have arguably increased their power and their 
importance—but it has lost its independence. States have become, to use the 
concept that Keohane and Nye popularized, interdependent; their role depends on 
and in turn influences that of other states, and much of their activity now happens in 
cooperation with other states. This is clearest in entities like the European Union or 
the WTO that create separate supranational bodies, but it is true more generally. In 
this context it matters also that states have become disaggregated, as Annemarie 
Slaughter has demonstrated—rather than viewing the state as a uniform actor we 
should look at the actions of its different agencies, which are sometimes in conflict 
with each other. Moreover, we must learn to look not just at states as lawmakers but 
also to focus on the significant lawmaking by non-state actors—arbitrators, 
institutions (so-called rule-formulating agencies), multinational corporations, ethnic 
communities, etc. In this context, religious law also reemerges as an important 
object of comparative law.  
All of this makes comparative law, if taken seriously, considerably more complex. 
Not only do we need to account for a broader variety of laws and legal systems than 
before. Moreover, and more importantly, we can no longer assume legal systems to 
be entities that are independent from each other. A comparison of English and 
French law, to use just a simple example, would be woefully incomplete if it only 
compared them as national systems. Such an analysis needs to account for the fact 
that both of them, as member states of the European Union, are not only part of the 
same legal system, but also exert influence on each other through their mutual role 
within EU law. An analysis of corporate law in Vietnam would be incomplete if it 
analyzed the legal transplants of US corporate law as a mere transfer between 
independent states and not also as an occurrence of imposition reminiscent of 
neocolonialism, a direct exertion of regulatory power from the United States (and 
other countries) on Vietnam, though the use of experts, education, conditional loans, 
etc. An analysis of the use of comparative law in the US Supreme Court cannot 
merely look at the court as a representative of the United States at large. It must 
instead recognize that such use of foreign sources takes place in a complex setting of 
both international relations with foreign countries and non-state actors and intra-
state relations with other branches of government and with the individual States. 
b) Beyond Positive Law 
Second, the waning of legal positivism also has implications on comparative law. 
Our studies of law as positive law have clearly become insufficient. We have learned 
about the importance of soft law. We are learning, again, that we must take seriously 
religious laws.  We have learned to take more seriously the fact that the role that 
positive law plays in different societies is different. On the one hand, positive law 
may have hardly any effect on society in some countries where it enforced 
arbitrarily or not at all and where it is considered, by large parts of the society, as 
illegitimate. In this regard comparative law is required to take functional 
equivalents of positive law into account—cultural norms and societal practices, 
rituals, traditions, and so forth. On the other hand, we have learned how activists 
and interest groups use even law that is not binding—treaties that have not been 
ratified, invocations of human rights that have a global appeal although they are not 
binding law—for strategic advances. 8  If we ignore such developments our 
comparative law studies become less relevant. 
c) Beyond Legal Science 
Third, and finally, it is not clear whether a scientific approach to comparative law in 
the sense of Rechtswissenschaft can still be maintained (if it ever could).  The most 
obvious reason is that legal science itself provides no criteria for the evaluation of 
law other than those derived from the law itself. It is for this reason that many 
comparative studies, while often strong in their country reports, are so vague and 
unsatisfying in their actual comparison: they can demonstrate similarities and 
differences between legal systems, but their legal arguments can neither explain nor 
evaluate these differences, because they are country-specific. 
The consequence in contemporary comparative law is, for many, the endorsement 
of extralegal sciences, in the hope to achieve neutrality. This explains the rise of 
comparative law and economics, especially in the form of statistical comparative 
law (somewhat grandiosely called empirical comparative law, as though statistical 
data were the only empirical data we have.)9 It also explains the rise of political 
science as a disciplinary focus on the materials of comparative law. 
This embrace of the social sciences is, in on way, very promising. It helps 
comparative lawyers to develop an outside perspective of the law, a way of 
measuring it. But this comes, more often than not, with a price.10 Far too often, social 
scientific studies in comparative law fall into one of three traps, all related. The first 
of those traps is the mere replacement of legal with economic language, with no gain 
made. Not much is gained, for example, if we merely replace the comparative law 
concept of ‘liability for others’ with that of a principal-agent relation. The second 
trap is the collapse into abstract models derived from economic reasoning as the 
yardstick against which legal systems are to be measured, because such a priori 
systems have little value for the real world. The third trap, finally, is that social 
scientific studies often fail to take law seriously in its complexity and specificity.11  
Arguably, this turn to the social sciences falls short. By turning to economics and 
political science we often merely try to recapture the objectivity that we lost with 
the decline of our faith in legal doctrine. We replace legal positivism with social 
science positivism and get nowhere closer to a true understanding of legal cultures. 
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In order to truly understand the foreign and our relation to it we will have to turn to 
other disciplines—cultural anthropology, cultural studies, science and technology 
studies. These disciplines have traditionally been hesitant about comparison 
because they fear the abstraction inherent in comparison, and they have been 
hesitant about the transnational because of their interest in local knowledge. That 
fear is not unjustified, and we can learn from it. But we can also, from our 
experience, contribute to overcoming it, or at least managing it. Comparison may 
always be reductive, but it can be fruitful as long as we remain aware of such 
reduction, and as long as we feel we can still generate genuine understanding. 
3) The Place of Comparative Law Today 
The question for the future of comparative law is misleading. It is exactly the 
problem of comparative law is that it, like socialism and paradise, has too often been 
promoted as being in the future and not the present, as something yet to come for a 
world yet to come. Rather than prepare comparative law for a future that may or 
may not come, we should adapt it for a present for which it is in many regards 
inadequate. The critique of national parochialism that inspired the 1900 Paris 
Congress remains relevant today. But comparative lawyers must also be critical of 
those tendencies in globalization that attempt to overcome the state without putting 
something else at its place, of new universalizing and totalitarian projects of 
governance that deny local cultures and specific experiences, that attempt to replace 
local democracy with the delocalized logic of the marketplace. It is our knowledge of 
specificities and generalities (the micro and the macro), of differences and 
similarities, of diversity and interconnection, that we should bring to the table of 
modern governance projects. And we should voice our critique when the ignorance 
of such knowledge leads to terrible consequences. 
It is tempting to suggest that comparative law has become either useless or 
universal. Either we no longer need it (because globalization is anathema) or it has 
become universal (we are all comparatists now). We can easily recognize that both 
claims are false, and that it would therefore be dangerous to replace comparative 
law with something else, be it transnational law, global law, legal pluralism, new 
governance, or the like. Between parochial nationalism and totalizing uniformism, 
comparative law maintains its important role of distinction and connection, of 
creating both proximity and distance, of allowing the other to be other and yet reach 
out to it. Comparative law is dead? Long live comparative law!  
